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THE RIGHTS OF AN EMPLOYEE AGAINST
EMPLOYERS' BLACKLISTS.
The question has arisen in connection with a recent strike
in Philadelphia as to the legal rights of an employee prevented from obtaining work through the combination of his
employers, either by means of a business blacklist or confidential communication. Together with all other questions
involving combinations of labor or capital interests, the
problem is in its infancy; its discussion. in view of the frequency of its occurrence, is pertinent.
To state the case, A., a union loom-worker, is employed
by the B. Co., textile manufacturers. The union orders its
members on strike, and in obedience to such orders. A.
leaves the B. Co. Finding himself without means of support, A. later applies to the C. Co., another textile firm. for
employment as a weaver. He is engaged and proves satis-
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factory, but the B. Co., learning of his action, notify the
C. Co. of his earlier relations with them, and ask that he
be discharged. A. is accordingly dismissed. Has he anyremedy?
Briefly put, if the communication made by the B. Co. to
the C. Co. is of a purely personal and private nature, A. has
no redress. There is no illegal conspiracy possible to be
shown; the law of libel is not directly in issue, for the transaction is in the nature of a semi-privileged communication.
Where, however, the method of notifying the C. Co. is of
an official nature, as by a trade blacklist or other concerted
action, we find a recent line of cases in each of which the
court has been restricted to the barest principles of law.
The question has not yet come before the courts of Pennsylvania for decision. It cannot be doubted that it will
soon arise.
Two remedial methods have been suggested in the case of
a blacklist. The first, by injunction, was dealt with at
length and finally refused by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421 (1892).
The second, by action for damages against the informant
company, was allowed in Mattison v. Lake Shore Railroad,
3 Ohio Dec. 526 (1895). It is to be noted in passing that
the blacklisting of discharged employees by a corporation,
or a combination of a number of employers to prevent the
employees discharged by one of them from obtaining employment, or otherwise attempting to prevent them from
obtaining employment, has, in Maine, Iowa, Georgia and
Montana, been made a statutory misdemeanor.
The right to form business relations is as surely a legal
right as to hold property. "It is a part of every man's civil
rights," says Cooley (Torts, 2 Ed., p. 328), "that he be left
to refuse business relations with any one with whom he can
make contracts, and if he is wrongfully deprived of this
right by others he is entitled to redress.
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Thus,

if one be prevented by the wrongful act of a third party
from securing some employment he has sought, le suffers
a legal wrong, provided that he can show that the failure
to employ him was the direct and natural consequence of the
wrongful act." Under the head of conspiracy to prevent
employment, Judge Cooley says:"By conspiracy is here intended the combination of two
or more persons to accomplish by some concerted action
an unlawful end to the injury of another."
He continues.:"The quality of the act and the nature of the injury
inflicted by it must determine the question whether the action
will lie."
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The most pertinent lines are those at the end, where, after
dealing with the subject principally with reference to the
business of employers, when this has been injured by strikers, the writer oncludes :"The same doctrine would undoubtedly be applied to the
case of employers who, by combination and unlawful means,
should prevent or seek to prevent the employment of any
special class of laborers. Every man has the liberty of employing and being employed, and every man must respect the
like liberty in others."
Under the head of "Malicious Interference with One's
Occupation," we find in Webb's Pollock on Torts, p. 4o6,
that
"There may be other malicious injuries not capable of
more specific definition, 'where a violent or malicious act is
done to a man's occupation, profession or way of getting a
livelihood.'"
Continuing, the editor notes that
"To maliciously interfere with the business of a person
engaged in a lawful occupation, with injurious results, constitutes a ground of action of trespass on the case. Such interference may be by a single individual or by a number of individuals conspiring together. . . . To maintain a suit
for the malicious interference with one's occupation, it is necessary to prove (i) intentional and willful acts; (2) calculated
to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3)
done with the unlawful purpose to cause such damage and
loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice), and (4) actual damages
and loss resulting."
The fundamental right involved is, of course, the right
of every individual to seek any legal employment he may,
and as the court said ;n Walker v. Cronin, io7 Mass. 562:"One of the aims of the common law has always been to
protect every person against the wrongful acts of every other
person, whether committed alone or in combination with
others; and it has provided an action for injuries done by disturbing a person in the enjoyment of any right or privilege
which he has."
In Boutwell v. Marr, 42 Atl. 6o7 (i8&)g, the Supreme Court
of Vermont said :"The crime of conspiracy consists in a combination of
two or more persons to effect an illegal purpose, either by
legal or illegal means, or to effect a legal purpose by illegal
means. (State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273.) But the grounds of
recovery in a civil suit are not identical with the elements of
the crime. The law punishes the mere agreement to effect
an illegal purpose or to use illegal means. But it is clear that
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a civil action cannot be sustained unless something causing
damage to the plaintiff has been done in furtherance of the
agreement; and it is claimed to be also requisite that the thing
done be something unlawful in itself. This would preclude a
reliance upon the existence of an illegal purpose, and require
that the means used be legal. The agreeing together to effect
an illegal purpose being itself illegal, it might seem that any
act done in furtherance of the agreement and resulting in
damage, even though itself not a violation of right, would sustain a recovery. But the view suggested is not sustained by
the authorities, and we proceed with our inquiry upon the
assumption that there can be no recovery unless illegal means
were employed.
"It is clear that every one has a right to withdraw his own
patronage when he pleases, but it is equally clear that he has
no right to employ threats or intimidation to divert the patronage of another, It it be true as a general proposition that
several may lawfully unite in doing to another's injury, even
for the accomplishment of an unlawful purpose, whatever each
has a right to do individually, it by no means follows that the
combination may not be so brought about as to make its
united action an unlawful means. . . . It may be true that
if the defendants, acting independently of any organization and
moved solely by similarity of interest and views, had united
;n withdrawing their patronage, the effect upon the plaintiff's
business would have been the same. . . . But in the
case supposed the united action would result from the free
exercise of individual choice. It will be seen upon further
inquiry that this cannot be said of the action of an organization like that operated by the defendants. . . . It is clear
that the law cannot concede to organizations of this character
the powers and immunities claimed for their association by
these defendants and retain its own power to protect the individual citizen in the free enjoyment of his capital or
labor."
The same point is incidentally discussed in Bohz Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223 (893).
The best opinion on the question of a right to an action
for damages against the blacklisting employer is undoubtedly that of Pratt, J., in Mattison v. Lake Shorc R. R. Co.
(supra). After reviewing authorities, he says :"Now, as I have perhaps said before, the question here
is whether the doctrines thus announced in favor of the employer are the principles which should be employed in the case
of the employee. It is said in Pollock on Torts, speaking of
the right to employment by an employee, that it is the most
serious right affecting the laboring man's life. Now, it seems
to me, with all due deference, of course, to the opinions of the
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courts which are adverse, that the employee's right to employment is equally sacred with the right of the employer to
employ him. It is not. only a serious right affecting a man's
life, but you may say that it is his life. The laboring man's
employment is the only thing that stands between him and
starvation, or what is very little less than starvation-pauperism-and it is for the public interest and the public good that
the right of a man to seek his own employment in any honest
work which he may seek should not be interfered with or
violated. This,, of course, does not interfere at all with the
right of a company or of a man to judge himself who he will
have work for him, and it makes no difference whether he refuses to let a man work for him because he is incompetent or
because he dislikes him; he has a right to seek his employees,
but, as is frequently said, one man's right ends where another
man's commences, and the right of the emnployer to discharge
cwds ith his own enployment, and he must not trench upon
the right of the employee to seek other employment by which
he may support himself and his family, and it is for the public
interest that the largest liberty to seek employment should be
before every man, whatever may be his employment or whatever may be his business, trade or occupation."
Summing up his opinion, the same Judge says:"It is also a matter of public interest to encourage men in
becoming proficient in their employment. It is, of course,
a matter of public policy a railroad should have the right to
employ such men as it sees fit and to judge itself of the competency of its employees; there is no doubt about that. It is,
however, for the public interest that a man who is skillful and
who has become proficient in his employment should be able
to find employment, if not with one railroad, then with another.

.

* * At least, that the field should be open to him

that he should have that right, and while a railroad company
may discharge their men and not employ them themselves,
they trench upon the rights of the employees whenever they,
by one deed or another, seek to prevent their employees from
getting other employment of other railroad companies, or
contribute or conspire in any way to prevent it."
So much for the right of an employee in an action for
damages. Let us examine his right to an injunction. In
Worthington v. Waring, 157 Mass. 421, the petition set forth
that the petitioners, the employees of a certain mill corporation, left work upon the refusal of their demand for
higher wages; that the treasurer and superintendent of the
corporation sent the names of the petitioners to the officers
of other corporations in the same city on a blacklist, which
informed the officers that the petitioners had left the mill
on a strike, and that thereupon the treasurer and superin-
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tendent conspired together, and with the officers of other
mills, and agreed not to employ the petitioners, with intent
to compel them either to go without work in the city or to
go back to work for the mill corporation at such wages as
that corporation should see fit to pay them. It did not
appear that any of the petitioners had existing contracts for
labor with which the'treasurer interfered. The prayer was
that the treasurer and superintendent be restrained from
annoying the petitioners and from interfering with their
rights to earn their livelihood at their trades, and that they
be enjoined to withdraw and destroy all blacklists or other
devices issued by them, mentioning the names of the petitioners. The Court, in a short opinion, held that if the
injury constituted a cause of action at all, the remedy was
by an action of tort to be brought by each petitioner separately. The only grievance alleged of a continuing nature
was the conspiracy not to employ the petitioners, and equity
furnished no precedents for enjoining such a conspiracy,
nor for compelling the defendants to employ the petitioners
or to procure work for them with other persons.
It would then seem that an injunction would in no case
lie against the employers, but in cases of a proven blacklist an actior for damages might be brought against the
offending employer. The ground for this would be that an
illegal conspiracy was taking place to prevent the exercise
by the employees of their right to work.
It has been broadly held in Pennsylvania, however, that it
is lawful for employers to combine to resist a combination
of workingmen in an attempt to advance wages, and that
an agreement made in furtherance of such a combination is
not ground for an action of conspiracy. The facts in the
case in point, Cote v. Murphy, 159 Pa. 42o (1894), do not resemble those in a case of blacklist. In this case A. brought
trespass to recover for damages occasioned by an alleged
conspiracy of defendants, and the evidence showed a combination of workmen to advance wages; a combined effort
of an association of employers to resist the advance, and an
agreement of employers that they would not sell material
to contractors who conceded the advance. A. sold material
to the strikers and contractors, and because of the combination could not secure all of the materials he desired, and was
therefore injured in his business. The Court refused defendant's request for binding instructions.
The question is therefore still an open one in Pennsylvania. Where no formal blacklist appears and the communication is of a purely personal nature, there being no
combination capable of being demonstrated, the employee
would seem to have no right of action. Where the black-
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list or the equivalent exists, the Pennsylvania courts would
probably follow Massachusetts and deny an injunction,
though they might very possibly allow an action for damages. This latter view, that the employee deserves such
protection, would seem to be slowly gaining ground, as
evidenced by the fact that four States have at a coniparatively recent date made the formation of blacklisting combinations punishable as misdemeanors.
Rupert Sargcnt Holland.

